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Non-traditional Maritime Security Threats in Northeast Asia: 





At the present, Northeast Asia, which is geopolitically surrounded by four great powers, the U.S., 
Russia, China, and Japan, has become a contested stage for enlarging the influences of these countries 
in the region. Naturally, this region has become the area where nations compete not only to rise to 
hegemonic status but also to achieve economic development, obtain energy resources, and maintain 
stability of SLOC. Even to this day, maritime environment has been a contested zone for numerous 
nations that are in rival relationships with each other. Powerful nations have explored the seas to 
pursue national interests as well as to seize key roles in the international society. However, the seas of 
the 21st century are no longer a stage for nations to compete or to engage in rivalry with each other. 
Certainly there is room for cooperation among countries in Northeast Asia. Cooperation among 
regional countries will be the key to open this window of opportunity to open this space of cooperation. 
With such constraining circumstances, this paper tries to find the way ahead to deal with the issue in 
terms of non-traditional maritime security threats in Northeast Asia.  
 





For a long time, the ‘Sea’ has directly affected the welfare of humanity. Indeed, its 
influence to us is valuable. It provides a stock of invaluable resources like oil, gas, and fish. 
It also provides the cheapest and safest means of transporting goods and people around the 
world. Geoffrey Till argues that the contemporary international economy basically stems 
from sea-based trading system (Till, 2015). At the same time, it also serves as a stage where 
nations gather to exercise its political strategies. Accordingly, ‘seapower’ has historically 
been one of the most important material elements in the rise and fall of great nations. 
To this day, the maritime environment has been a contested zone for numerous nations to 
engage in rivalry with each other. Powerful nations have explored the seas to pursue national 
interests as well as to seize key roles in the international society. However, the seas of the 
21st century are no longer a stage for nations to compete or rival each other. The significance 
of today’s maritime environment goes beyond a territorial space of each nation’s operations. 
It is a symbolic space. Independent actions and characteristics of various activities carried 
out in such space have also been subject to great change. 
On the other hand, an individual actor who disturbs maritime activities and poses threats 
to maritime security is no longer limited to a specific nation. Non-traditional forces 
threatening maritime security through acts of piracy, maritime terrorism, maritime smuggling, 
disaster and calamity, or maritime pollution are now non-government groups clearly defined 
as small scale pirates, radical religious groups, or multinational criminal organizations. And 
they are growing in size. Current world events reflect that threats to maritime security have 
consistently become much more organized and systematic. Such evidence attests the need to 
stress the importance of countermeasures to non-traditional maritime threats. 
 KYUNGHAN LIM  136 
 
In relation to non-traditional maritime threats, much attention is required to the maritime 
environment of Northeast Asia. Recent disclosure of the United States’s pivot to Asia 
strategy (or rebalancing strategy), has intensified the security competition between the U.S. 
and China in the maritime region of Northeast Asia (Lim, 2012). Accordingly, the same area 
has been subject to intense competition between China and Japan as well.  
Much importance is laid on the maritime area of Northeast Asia because of the 
coexistence of various non-traditional security issues that need to be solved head-on by 
powerful nations around the world. The potential of Northeast Asia’s maritime region to be 
an area of cooperation through mutual efforts to counter non-traditional threats to maritime 
security as opposed to being a battlefield for competing nations must be carefully  considered. 
With the understanding of aforementioned situation, this paper aims to achieve the 
following. First, reveal the gravity of maritime security through investigation of changing 
elements of threats to maritime security. Various forms of threat to maritime security will be 
identified and the cause of such threats will be investigated to promote attention to maritime 
security. Second, examine how issues on international countermeasures against threats to 
maritime security cooperation are being discussed and forecast on future discussions. Trends 
of development of maritime security discussions at the international level will be reviewed 
and constructive methods to further develop cooperation in maritime security will be 
proposed. The ultimate purpose of this article will be to find answers to questions that arise 
from these issues. 
 
 
2. DILEMMA BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST 
ASIA 
 
In general, maritime security can be categorized into two fields: traditional maritime 
security and non-traditional maritime security in which maritime strategy, maritime dispute, 
maritime environmental security and others are dealt with (Kim, 2015; Bueger, 2015; 
Germand, 2015). The former is mostly used to describe hegemonic competition between 
strong powers, and the latter is defined as a cooperative activity to prevent maritime 
contingencies. In numerous instances, the optimal choice for a country leads one towards a 
dilemma. Despite the attention given to non-traditional security issues and the scope they 
provide for cooperation, traditional concerns, particularly the protection and assertion of 
sovereignty, are the principal cause of instability in the region (Bateman, 2015). 
Above all, Northeast Asia is a very geographical terminology for geographers. It can 
include China, Russia, Japan, and two Koreas. However, Northeast Asia as a place has 
specific meaning for scholars of international relations. For them, the definition of Northeast 
Asian countries might somewhat differ from those of geographical calculations. Northeast 
Asia has emerged as the hub of global geo-political, geo-economic and geo-strategic 
significance in Asia these days. Above all, Northeast Asian maritime issues are timely and 
very important because in recent years the relationship between China, Japan and Korea has 
been a critical agenda not only in Asia but also over the world. 
Northeast Asia is well known for its instability in terms of security issues (Ross, 1999; 
Christensen, 1999; Friedberg, 1993/1994). Firstly, Northeast Asia is the only region where 
the two super powers, so called Group of Two (G-2), the U.S. and China, confront each other 
in security issues. This naturally leads to the resulting phenomenon that the region will 
become the center of focus (Lim, 2014). This is because the ultimate outcome of this 




bilateral conflict, whether they become substantial armed conflicts such as maritime 
skirmishes or become peaceful through cooperative means, will affect the international 
security environment. The U.S. and Chinese maritime security competition in Northeast Asia 
is directly connected to the entire regional security environment.  
Moreover, during the Cold War, the Japanese Navy faithfully fulfilled the mission of 
deterring the Soviet Navy. But now it is doing the same task against China. Russia has been 
emphasizing a need to build a strong Russia since 2000, and has been putting further efforts 
to reinforce current naval capabilities of the Pacific Fleet. The first priority of the world’s 
navies, of course, is to defend the country’s interests and to deter war by showing potential 
adversaries that they can fight them.  
In addition to that, North Korea launched its first Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 
(SLBM). Because it has a nuclear program, underwater missile firing capability means that 
North Korea can fire its missile covertly, anywhere, wherever it desires which gives no room 
for prediction. All these maritime issues are deeply related to the traditional threats in 
Northeast Asia. It is the reason why maritime security issues are becoming more important 
factors to explain and prospect the relations between countries in the region (Park et al., 
2015; Feng and He, 2014; Graham, 2014; Kumara, 2015; Lee and Lim, 2015). From the 
realist pessimists’ perspectives, one’s military rise enhances the potential power competition 
between neighboring countries in the reason.  
On the other hand, cooperation is required in the seas of the region both to ensure the 
effective of the seas and activities within them, and to establish arrangements that will 
prevent tensions in these seas from escalating into conflict in the future (Bateman, 2015). 
Non-traditional maritime security issue is a newly developing concern within the 
international politics. There are many cooperation mechanisms do exist to support the 
development of countries’ relationship. In many cases, Northeast Asia appeared directly 
associated with the non-traditional maritime security issues. The next chapter will be 
supporting the idea in detail.  
 
 
3. NON-TRADITIONAL MARITIME THREATS IN THE NORTHEAST ASIAN SEAS 
 
Recently, the so-called transnational organized crime which encompasses virtually all 
profit-motivated criminal activities has become one of the most significant threats. 
Specifically, the major forms of transnational organized crime are related to trafficking 
smuggling of migrants, cocaine, heroin, and maritime piracy, etc. These can be categorized 
into non-traditional maritime threats. More specifically, non-traditional maritime threats in 
the Northeast Asian seas can be largely classified into three subjects: threats to the stability 
of the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) through piracy and maritime terrorism, maritime 
criminal activities such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and 
maritime incidents such as pollution in the maritime environment and natural disasters such 
as Tsunami. 
 
3.1 Threats to International SLOCs 
 
A term most often used in international discussion on the importance of maritime security 
is SLOC, or sea lanes of communication, which are transit routes most frequently used by 
maritime traffic. Today, the term SLOC not only signifies the route itself, but also is used as 
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a symbol for the importance of maritime security. Although all illegal activities at sea are a 
threat to SLOC, piracy and maritime terrorism are regarded to be more imminent due to their 
use of direct violent force.  
Maritime piracy and terrorism goes beyond simply taking a ship and its crew for ransom 
and uses heavy weapons to directly attack ships when necessary, potentially causing a large 
scale disaster at sea. Further, such violent activities come across as being more severe due to 
its relative frequency compared to disputes on territorial seas that may manifest through war, 
localized warfare, or other large scale disputes. 
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) yearly report, 298 cases of 
piracy, including armed robbery against ships, occurred in the year 2013 alone. This is a 
decrease in 43 cases (-12.6%) compared to the year 2012, which recorded 341 cases of 
maritime piracy. In the east African region including the Gulf of Aden, cases of piracy 
showed a 30.4% decrease from 2011 to 2012, recording 286 cases in 2011 and 199 cases in 
2012. Only 20 ships were hijacked in the area in 2013, reflecting a great decease in pirate 
threat. However, the situation is the opposite in the South China Sea, West Africa, and the 
Indian Ocean. For example, in 2013 alone, 143 ships were hijacked in South China Sea, 
which is an increase in 160% compared to 86 ships hijacked in 2012.1 
The frequency of maritime terrorism is relatively lower than maritime piracy. Maritime 
terrorism can be largely classified into attacks against naval ships or public vessels under a 
political agenda and attacks against merchant vessels, oil-tankers or passenger ships under 
economic or religious agenda. Some maritime terrorism is carried out under complex and 
various purposes. Terrorist attacks on the French oil-tanker Limberg and Philippine ferry 
SuperFerry respectively in 2002 and 2004 shows how political, economic, and religious 
agenda can coexist in a terrorist attack. The fact that ferries and cruise ships are also targets  
 
 
Figure 1. Maritime Terrorism 
 
                                                           
1 International Maritime Organization, “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,” 
Annual Report 2013. 




of maritime piracy and terrorism brings about a great ripple effect because of their potential 
to dampen general maritime activities. The suicide bombing attack on the USS Cole in the 
port of Aden that used a small boat is a good example of how a terrorist group attacks under 
a political agenda. 
Another area of concern is that organizations capable of maritime piracy have the 
potential to crossover into maritime terrorism, which will continue to be a threat to 
worldwide SLOC. Direct threat to the SLOC still continues since potential pirate attacks to 
maritime trade and energy transportation occur in coastal areas as opposed to out in the wide 
ocean. A large scale attack by a terrorist group linked to pirates in the Middle East or South 
China Sea (The Malacca Strait), would cause a worldwide economy and security crisis. This 
shows how maritime piracy and terrorist groups pose a great threat not only to Korea but the 
whole world. Considering that 50% of the world’s port traffic passes through Northeast Asia 
(South China Sea),2 potential damages of an attack would be overwhelming. 
 
3.2 Maritime Crimes of WMD Proliferation 
 
As much as the variety of crimes has increased, the location of crimes has also been 
diversified. Maritime crimes are crimes that are committed in ships of foreign flag that are 
outside the jurisdiction of a nation, with the exclusion of piracy and terrorism. In a broader 
sense, maritime crime includes WMD transportation, maritime smuggling, illegal trade, 
illegal crossing of borders, and maritime pollution, etc.  
WMD proliferation is one of the most dangerous threats that the international community 
in the 21st century faces both at the domestic levels and international level. In general, WMD 
proliferation usually occurs around specific nations and involves weapons, and therefore is 
one of the traditional threats to maritime security. At the same time, WMD transportation 
may not be classified as a direct threat to maritime security, but proliferation of illegal 
weapons such as nuclear warheads and missiles causes direct threats to the international 
society as well as to individual nations, therefore causing a severe erosion of maritime 
security.  
Nations such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and Israel that develops and unofficially 
possesses nuclear weapons may transport WMD such as nuclear weapons as well as 
biological weapons and the weapons production materials may become involved in illegal 
transportation of such materials through sea. Further, failed states and international terrorist 
groups may attempt to purchase WMD through maritime trade. They may aim to use WMD 
in order to maximize their illegal goals. Efforts to execute a more catastrophic terrorist attack 
after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 still continue. Immediate measures are hard 
to implement at sea and international cooperation to eradicate terrorism is also difficult. 
Therefore, attempts to proliferate WMD through maritime transportation will continue to be 
a threat to maritime security for the time being. 
The last problem that needs to be addressed with a short-term perspective is the 
possibility of linkage between maritime terrorism and WMD proliferation (Calhoun, 2006). 
Many potential terrorist groups have the kind of programs to develop WMD. And there is 
growing evidence that terrorists are seeking the ability to use WMD, such as nuclear 
weapons and biological and chemical weapons (BCW). Ironically, the cheapest and safest 
way of transporting system helps WMD proliferation more easily throughout the world. The 
                                                           
2 The South China Sea Virtual Library Website, www.community.middlebury.edu/~scs/intro.html. 
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WMD threat is real and the linkage between terrorism and WMD is also a  more visible 
threat these days.  
 
3.3 Natural Disasters and Maritime Pollution 
 
Another important cause of threat to maritime security is natural disasters3 and pollution. 
Natural disasters cause severe casualties as well as damages to properties, and therefore is a 
mutual threat to all mankind. Especially, the outcomes and severity of natural disasters that 
occur in the ocean or at least start in the ocean is hard to estimate and causes extensive 
damages. An example would be the Tsunami in December 2004 that started off the coast of 
Indonesia that left 230,000 people dead or missing and a million people homeless.  
Examples of other direct threats would be hurricane Katrina in the U.S. in 2005, cyclone 
disaster in Myanmar in 2008, the earthquake in eastern Japan in 2011, and flooding in 
Southeast Asia. Most of these natural disasters are caused by climate change. Natural 
disasters caused by global warming are growing in scale while the damages they cause also 
are growing in severity; continuous efforts to prepare and prevent such threats to maritime 
security is imperative. 
Also, maritime debris found in the ocean is a direct threat to the livelihood of mankind. 
The garbage patch six times bigger than Korea that exists between Hawaii and the 
continental U.S. is a threat to maritime ecosystem. It may cause accidents among navigating 
ships, and is a potential threat to maritime tourist resources and so on. Appropriate attention 
must be given to secondary damages that may be caused by natural disasters.  
The incalculable amount of garbage that washed out of Japan every day during the great 
earthquake has brought attention to maritime debris. The potential types of damages caused 
by maritime garbage would be a loss of fishery and biological resources, damages to natural 
habitats and the ecosystem, hindrance to maritime safety, pollution of maritime environment 
and sceneries, and influx of foreign species that may cause economical and ecological 
damages. Maritime debris may cause threat to sustainable development, in both quality and 
quantity. 
    
 
4. COOPERATION IN MARITIME SECURITY 
 
Although there were many attempts to enhance global maritime cooperation, some 
problems still remain. First, some countries still consider the maritime environment as a 
stage for competition over resources inducing the national frictions. Second, there exist 
continuous territorial disputes on the islands. Third, the existing efforts of maritime security 
are overly concentrated in certain region such as the Northeast Asia. Because of this situation, 
there are many neglected areas that suffer from maritime crime. Considering the points 
mentioned above, this section discusses maritime cooperation in the Northeast Asia, which is 
relatively less noticed among global issues in terms of non-traditional maritime security 
threats.  
Maritime security threats have never in history been spreading as fast as it is doing today. 
                                                           
3 Natural disasters are fall into three broad groups. Those caused by movements of the Earth; Weather 
related disasters; Flood, mudslides, landslide and famine. Michael Evans, “Natural Disasters,” Earth 
Times, May 14, 2011. 




As the importance of the ocean is increasing as the source of livelihood, threats to the ocean 
have, paradoxically, also been increasing. Luckily, one point for relief is that there is a 
consensus on the importance of SLOC. Therefore, active maritime security cooperation is in 
place in order to protect SLOC against threats of maritime piracy. Although there are some 
disagreements on the issue of WMD non-proliferation and maritime resource development, 
general awareness of the importance of maritime security is in place. Positive evaluation on 
the necessity and effectiveness of trans-border cooperation is agreed upon.  
As discussed above, one can see that there are various elements that threaten maritime 
security. The cause of maritime security has become an element that surpasses a national 
level that goes beyond national borders. With the exception of maritime territorial disputes, 
most other threats to maritime security have trans-border characteristics. In order to deal with 
a trans-border issue, a trans-border countermeasure is needed. Therefore, an international 
level of maritime security cooperation is in critical demand. Recent efforts of security 
cooperation between nations have recognized this characteristic and have assembled around 
the United Nations in order to foster cooperation between nations as well as experts and non-
government organizations.   
First, security cooperation in the area of counter-piracy is the most ideal cooperation that 
takes place. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has led the effort to gather 
support and cooperation of the international community in order to fight against maritime 
piracy. On World Maritime Day which was held on March 2011, the Secretary General 
stressed that maritime piracy activities in Somalia were “completely unacceptable” and asked 
for the immediate cooperative response of the international community.  
Fortunately, pirate activities off the coast of Somalia had decreased by 22.6% in 2009, 
compared to 2010. However, maritime piracy activities in the Indian Ocean and South China 
Sea are continuously increasing. There were early speculation in 2009 that maritime piracy 
activities in the seas other than the region in the vicinity of Somalia would increase (Hanson, 
2009). The words of the United Nations Secretary General reflect that efforts of counter-
piracy must continue, and strong cooperative naval activities must be developed in various 
regions of the world. 
International cooperation to suppress maritime piracy can be divided into military 
intervention and methods that urge international collaboration. First, military intervention 
can be observed in the coast of Somalia and in Southeast Asian waters. A Combined Task 
Force 151 (CTF-151) was established in January 2009 and operates off the coast of Somalia. 
The components of CTF-151 are flexible and varies on the number and types of ships and 
aircraft that are deployed by the member states. Another characteristic of CTF-151 is its 
collaboration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union 
Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) to conduct anti-piracy operations. In Southeast Asia, 
MALSINDO, comprised of military forces of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia engage in 
counter-piracy operations mostly in the Malacca Strait. 
In addition to anti-piracy operations, international efforts to discuss cooperation in 
suppressing maritime piracy are being put into practice. The Global G-20 summit, Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and ASEAN+3 (+3 are Japan, Korea and China), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), and East Asia Forum are some of the 
forums where discussions that are taking place in order to directly and indirectly collaborate 
on economic development of the international society as well as dealing with maritime 
security threats such as maritime piracy. The basis of this cooperation is the belief that 
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economic issues and international security issues are not mutually exclusive. 
Another active area of collaboration is WMD non-proliferation through maritime efforts. 
On December 9th, 2002, the Sosan, a North Korean ship, was transporting parts and 
components for 23 scud-type missiles from North Korea to Yemen. With the information 
provided by the United States government, Spanish forces conducted ship search (visit, 
board, search, and seizure, VBSS) but was unable to find grounds to stop weapons trade 
between North Korea and Yemen. Shortly after, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
was put in place. With U.S. President George W. Bush leading the initiative, the non-
proliferation security initiative focused on the non-proliferation of WMD.  
Various forms of export control systems exist internationally in order to promote non-
proliferation of WMD. However, most of these systems were established before the 1990s 
which was at the time of the Cold War and therefore does not sufficiently reflect the changed 
international security environment after the Cold War.4 The newly implemented Proliferation 
Security Initiative is an organization that aims to actively find methods to stop proliferation 
of WMD through enforcing ship stop orders and conducting VBSS. An example of these 
efforts would be the United States Navy destroyer’s tracking of the North Korean ship 
Kangnam in 2009 under suspicious that the ship is carrying WMD components. 
The U.S.-led PSI is seen to have resulted a visible effect, but it also shows the limitations 
of international collaboration. Hesitation on maritime transportation of WMD has been 
recently observed. Nations that are suspected to transport WMD materials are limited to 
nations such as North Korea and Iran, which are nations that already attract much attention 
from the international society. Diverse efforts to acquire information and conduct 
surveillance of these nations aside from the Proliferation Security Initiative are already in 
place.  
Therefore, there is now a higher possibility of detection of WMD materials even before 
they are embarked on a ship. In effect, since tracking starts before a ship sets sail with WMD 
materials, the number of ships with WMD has decreased significantly. Meanwhile, China, 
Russia and some nations hesitate from joining the PSI, reasons being that the PSI impedes 
freedom of navigation and goes against UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Other factors 
that hinder the activation of PSI is doubts about its effectiveness and the belief that the PSI 
does not directly benefit the interest of each nation. Other reasons may include 
dissatisfaction in the U.S.-led maritime security cooperation system. 
Of all areas of maritime security cooperation, cooperative activities of maritime disaster 
relief have many times been verified. During the Tsunami disaster in Indonesia in 2004, 
worldwide disaster relief activities were conducted by various nations including the U.S. and 
China.5 The importance of humanitarian aid came before each nation’s national interest and 
large-scale relief operations were swiftly carried out. Various political and economical 
security systems mentioned above are also continuously considered as relief and aid for 
maritime disasters. Common ground has been formed in the area of forecasting natural 
disasters, sharing information, and post-disaster relief activities. In response to the  
                                                           
4 Examples of export control include: Zangger Committee (founded 1974), Nuclear Supplier Group 
(founded 1978), The Australia Group (founded 1985), Missile Technology Control Regime (founded 
1987) and Wassenaar Arrangement (founded 1996). 
5 See Naval War College, Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern 
Indonesia (Newport: Naval War College, 2007) for details on humanitarian assistance utilizing naval 
forces during the Tsunami in Indonesia. 




Table 1. Levels of Naval Cooperation and Its Applications 
Levels of Naval Cooperation Application of Naval Cooperation 
High-level 
(Alliance level) 
Combined Combat Operations/Exercises 
- Anti Submarine Warfare Exercise 
- Missile Defense 
- Mine Counter Measure Exercise 
Mid-level 
(Coalition level) 
Naval Peacekeeping and Peacemaking 
Anti-Piracy and Maritime Boundary Patrols 
Surveillance and Intelligence Sharing 
Low-level 
(Maritime Security level) 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
Search and Rescue 
Non-combatant Evacuation Operation 
Marine Science Research 
Source: Soonkun Oh, “The Development of US-Korea-Japan’s Trilateral Naval Cooperation in 
Northeast Asia,” The 8th KIMS-CNA Conference on Maritime Security, Nov. 4, 2015, p. 97. 
 
 
earthquake in Japan in 2011, the U.S. deployed its aircraft carrier to provide aid. Many 
nations in the region also send military personnel and relief deployments; this can be 
understood to be in the same context. 
Specifically, it is very important to understand that there are different levels and 
applications of cooperation nations’ military assets. Naval cooperation can be broadly 
defined as any collaborative military activities at sea. In fact, the naval diplomacy should 
play a vital role in establishing the potential for facing the non-traditional security threats in 
Northeast Asia. Table 1 shows the levels of naval cooperation in terms of application of 
naval cooperation. From a low-level to a high-level, naval cooperation deals with maritime  
security issues among countries, according to the degree of their relationships. 
This idea is based on the belief that selective engagement strategy of countries can 
prevent WMD from threatening. David Yost, Professor of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
argued that the U.S. military overseas deployments “can provide early warning of aggressive 
actions and allow for prompt responses to such attacks; allow for more effective post-conflict 
occupation and peacekeeping operations (PKO); fulfill obligations made in peace treaties or 
defense alliances to protect friendly countries from aggression; and support the non-
proliferation cause by reassuring nations that might otherwise develop nuclear weapons or 
other weapons of mass destruction for their own defense” (Yost, 1995).  
    
 
5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION  
 
Northeast Asia, being geopolitically surrounded by four great powers, the U.S., Russia, 
China, and Japan, has become a contested stage for enlarging the influences of these 
countries in the region. It has become the area where nations compete not only to rise to 
hegemonic status but also to obtain economic development, energy resources, and the 
stability of SLOC. Even to this day, maritime environment has been a contested zone for 
numerous nations to compete in rivalry with each other. Powerful nations have explored the 
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seas to pursue national interests as well as to seize key roles in the international society. 
However, the seas of the 21st century are no longer a stage for nations to compete against 
each other. Certainly there is room for cooperation among countries in Northeast Asia. 
Piracy and maritime terrorism have become the new threats to maritime security in 
Northeast Asia. This region requires more cooperation rather than resource competition and 
territorial dispute. In many countries in this region such as China and other Northeast Asian 
countries, the new trends of global cooperative efforts are required. However, cooperation in 
this region is still in the early stages of establishing the relationships of mutual confidence. 
There remain the barriers interrupting the deeper cooperation with friction. The factors that 
disturb cooperation include distrust among countries and increasing national tension. The 
issue that matters most is sovereignty. These problems are triggered by competition over 
resources, such as fishing, oil, and gas. 
Although close cooperation in against maritime security threats are taking place, some 
tasks still remain. First, some nations still see the maritime environment to be a stage for 
competition. Competition between the U.S. and China on maritime security is an important 
issue that must be deal with in a peaceful manner. As more and more importance is 
emphasized on the maritime environment, another important problem that arises is the 
continuous territorial disputes on the islands in the South China Sea amongst the nations that 
surround them. Most islands in the South China Sea are subject to territorial disputes, 
including the Spratly Islands (Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei), the Paracel 
Archipelago (China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines, Brunei), and most recently the 
Scarborough Shoal (China, Philippines). The possibility inciting a neighboring nation by 
developing military power in order to safeguard national security as well as SLOC could be a 
factor that impedes full-scale maritime security cooperation. Especially in Northeast Asia, 
tension arising from territorial disputes is the reason behind limitations in active 
collaboration against maritime security threats.  
Having full control over territorial seas is important because it is related to  economic 
interests, because these territorial seas provide marine and fishery resources. Therefore, the 
inability of nations to easily give up such interests will continue to impede the cooperative 
methods between nations. And furthermore, regional maritime security cooperative system 
still has room to improve even in peaceful time like today. Regional cooperation in 
humanitarian aid activities, maritime search and rescue, and maritime pollution prevention is 
of utmost importance. A problem that needs to be solved is the fact that organizations that 
can take charge of these missions are insufficient. Humanitarian aid activities, maritime 
search and rescue, and maritime pollution prevention are key non-traditional threats against 
maritime security.  
When such threat arises, most nations actively come in aid to provide national 
cooperation. However, there are limitations to sharing information and preparing for swift 
response before these incidents happen. Especially, the issue of maritime debris and 
pollution is a problem that needs early attention and response efforts since if it is left 
unattended, it may one day lead to a irreversible disaster. However, most nations are passive 
and evasive in sharing awareness and providing a solution for the current situation and 
leading with a responsible role. At this time, efforts to stop the aggravation between nations 
in Northeast Asia are necessary. Such efforts must be realized by frequent and continuous 
actions to hold conversations aimed to establish understanding and agreements between 
nations.   
Another problem in maritime security cooperation is that efforts of maritime security are 




overly concentrated in the Somalian seas. Anti-piracy operations are unique in the sense that 
every party deals with a mutual enemy. No interests are violated and efforts are put into 
methods that mutually benefit each party. Because of the focus in the Somalian seas, anti-
piracy operations in other areas of the world may be neglected. Additional cooperation is 
needed in strengthening the operational capability in other seas where piracy operations are 
active. Much more active international cooperation can be promoted if the concept of a 
mutual enemy, as shared by nations against maritime piracy, is applied to the problem of 
WMD proliferation instead of the current political and ideological approach of WMD 
proliferation.  
In order to solve the problems mentioned above, more efforts must be made to establish a 
new maritime order through formulation of a plan to further peace and cooperation in 
Northeast Asia. Maritime disputes in Northeast Asia have continuously evolved in areas of 
international politics, economics, and law. The issues at hand are multi-layered in nature, 
with disputes in territories, resource development, boundary demarcation, environmental 
pollution at its center. As part of an effort to work on ideas in promoting peace and 
cooperation in Northeast Asia and to find a concept of sustainable maritime order, separate 
approaches to solving disputes in boundary disputes of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and 
continental shelves, resource development, and maritime environment protection must be 
taken with goals to achieve multi-party consensus on general maritime issues.  
In this era of new dynamics and challenges, Northeast Asia’s peaceful cooperation will 
play its role as a mechanism that provides stability amongst nations such as the United States, 
China, and Japan, and as well as to nations in Southeast Asia. Peaceful cooperation in 
Northeast Asia will be a first step to promote security cooperation and ultimately to rid of all 
security dilemma between nations. We must remember that the sea is at least as important to 
our future as it has been to our past.  
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